Why I declined to serve

One of the Generals who turned down the offer to become the "War Czar", John J. Sheehan, former Marine Corps General, writes an essay for the Washington Post. The essay explains why he turned down the post, basically decrying the fact that the administration has no focused plan on how to deal with Iraq or the region in general.

I've got more reasons for you, General. A) The post is superfluous as we already have people who are supposed to be doing this job. B) If you decided upon a strategy that countered anything in the VP's mind, then he would undermine you. C) Concentrating so much power into one person's hand, especially a person who only reports to the President is dangerous, undemocratic, and it may be unconstitutional. This last reason was the one that was most salient for me. The following is part of Sheehan's reasons:

What I found in discussions with current and former members of this administration is that there is no agreed-upon strategic view of the Iraq problem or the region...

The United States has and will continue to have strategic interests in the greater Middle East well after the Iraq crisis is resolved and, as a matter of national interest, will maintain forces in the region in some form. The Iraq invasion has created a real and existential crisis for nearly all Middle Eastern countries and created divisions among our traditional European allies, making cooperation on other issues more difficult. In the case of Iran, we have allowed Tehran to develop more policy options and tools than it had a few years ago...

We cannot "shorthand" this issue with concepts such as the "democratization of the region" or the constant refrain by a small but powerful group that we are going to "win," even as "victory" is not defined or is frequently redefined...

But after thoughtful discussions with people both in and outside of this administration, I concluded that the current Washington decision-making process lacks a linkage to a broader view of the region and how the parts fit together strategically. We got it right during the early days of Afghanistan -- and then lost focus. We have never gotten it right in Iraq. For these reasons, I asked not to be considered for this important White House position. These huge shortcomings are not going to be resolved by the assignment of an additional individual to the White House staff. They need to be addressed before an implementation manager is brought on board.